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Abstract 
 
A new framework for analysing subnational policy-making is applied to climate governance 
in the 'twin towns' of Newcastle upon Tyne and Gelsenkirchen. Low levels of resource 
interdependence between central and local government in England mean that Newcastle 
Council has to rely heavily on other horizontal actors to achieve its climate objectives. In 
contrast, Gelsenkirchen Council receives substantial support from higher tiers of government, 
which gives it greater control over policymaking within the locality. Greater independence 
between tiers of government can make it more difficult for subnational bodies to adopt the 
kind of ambitious policies that may be necessary to combat wicked and/or significant policy 
challenges such as climate change. Instead, interdependent ‘joint-decision’ systems, which 
facilitate mutual support across tiers of government, may be better equipped to ensure that 
subnational public bodies have the capacity to act appropriately. 
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Introduction 
  
Although there is a now a large literature on the role of subnational governments in 
combating climate change (see Bulkeley 2010 for an overview), scholars have only focused 
relatively recently on what their approaches may tell us about urban governance (Bulkeley 
and Betsill 2013; Geels 2014; Miao and Li 2017). Here, I take these recent studies further, 
drawing on a new theoretical approach to understand local policymaking and applying it to 
climate governance in one German and one English city. I contrast how the municipalities in 
these two cities work with other vertical and horizontal actors to increase their capacity to 
develop and implement their climate change strategies, and identify how other tiers of 
government and local stakeholders influence urban policymaking.  
 
First, I place the investigation in the context of wider debates about the changing role of the 
state and how governing actors (including cities) seek to address wicked issues, particularly 
climate mitigation. This highlights how existing theoretical perspectives on multi-level 
governance are unable to explain which actors are driving policy-making at the local level; 
consequently I propose a more holistic framework to help understand these processes. 
Following a brief methods section, I apply this framework to contrast how the municipalities 
of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle upon Tyne are dealing with climate change, to identify 
which actors are influencing decision-making in the two cities, and to analyse how their 
governance arrangements may be changing. Based on this analysis, I then draw wider 
conclusions about how intergovernmental relations shape local decision-making processes.  
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Analysing wicked issues at the local level 
 
As policymakers have become increasingly concerned with tackling ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel 
and Webber 1973), they have sought to work collaboratively across state and non-state 
organisational boundaries in order to increase their capacity to act. Pollitt (2016) has 
described climate change as the ‘ultimate wicked issue’; there is widespread recognition that 
private and voluntary actors at all levels need to play a role in addressing it (Newell 2000; 
Bulkeley and Betsill 2003; Ferry and Eckersley 2016). Crucially, however, this could mean 
that power relationships between governing actors may need to change in order to develop 
more effective policy (Peters and Pierre 2001).  
 
Many previous studies of climate change policy have adopted multi-level governance 
perspectives to illustrate how different actors both within and across tiers influence decision-
making (Lenschow 1999; Auer 2000; Bulkeley 2005; Bulkeley and Betsill 2005; Schreurs 
2008). Hooghe and Marks (2003) offer a useful typology of multi-level governance to aid 
system categorisation: Type I consists of relatively static, multi-purpose jurisdictions within 
which a single public body has direct responsibility for a range of services; whereas more ad 
hoc, task-specific organisations are more common in Type II arrangements. Importantly, they 
did not elaborate on how these different types might shape policy-making; few other scholars 
have sought to detail them further (Bache 2012). Therefore, although Hooghe and Marks’ 
typology might help to illustrate the fact that different jurisdictions have adopted contrasting 
governance arrangements, it does not explain the reasons for these differences or provide the 
theoretical purchase that could predict the ways in which they may change. Accordingly, the 
overall idea of ‘(multi-level) governance’ is more useful as an analogy than a theoretical tool. 
Although it highlights the involvement of numerous stakeholders in making and 
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implementing policy, it does not help us to understand power relations within these networks 
and therefore cannot assist us in identifying which actors are most influential in policymaking 
processes (Smith 2003; Zito 2015; Eckersley 2017a; Marquandt 2017).   
 
Simultaneously, research has highlighted how institutional structures (such as the nature of 
central-local relations) shape the level of municipal capacity and ultimately influence local 
climate governance (Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Bai 2007; Romero Lankao 2007; Holgate 
2007; Schreurs 2008; Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009; Eckersley 2017b). However, these studies 
generally focus on the formal competences or the degree of autonomy that municipalities can 
exercise from a legal perspective: most have not tried to dissect urban governance 
relationships in order to understand the power dynamics that also influence decision-making 
(Bulkeley 2010; Shey and Belis 2013). These informal structures are particularly important in 
‘Type II’ jurisdictions: they tend to be less hierarchical and more open to interest group 
participation – and therefore represent fertile ground for a shift in the nature of public and 
private authority.  
 
Following Rhodes (1981), actors that have the necessary resources to achieve their objectives 
are likely to wield political power in these contexts. Therefore, if subnational governments do 
not need to rely heavily on other vertical and horizontal actors, we can expect them to be 
relatively powerful within governance arrangements and determine their policy objectives 
fairly autonomously. In contrast, where public bodies need to work closely with societal 
actors and/or other tiers of government, they will have less ‘power to’ shape policymaking. 
We might expect to encounter this when public actors try to address wicked issues or in 
contexts where the state is weak and/or underdeveloped (see Partzsch 2017 for a discussion 
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about the differences between ‘power to, ‘power with’ and ‘power over’ in environmental 
politics). 
 
This suggests that a crucial factor influencing the nature of local governance arrangements is 
the level of internal capacity within the municipality (Pierre 2014), defined as the local 
authority’s ability to achieve its policy objectives without having to rely on other actors for 
resources (Holgate 2007; Matthews 2012). Critically, we should not confuse capacity with 
autonomy, which refers to the degree of freedom from central direction. For example, a 
subnational authority that enjoys significant autonomy may be constrained by a lack of 
resources, an unclear constitutional status and/or a reliance on unpredictable revenue streams. 
As such, greater freedom from higher tiers of government might actually reduce capacity 
within a municipality and mean that it has to rely more on other actors to achieve its 
objectives. As Homsy and Warner (2015) found in their study of US municipalities, these 
arrangements could mean that subnational governments have fewer resources to develop 
effective sustainability policies, when compared to jurisdictions that receive support from 
other tiers of government. International relations scholars have been familiar with these 
concepts of state capacity, interdependence and power for several decades (Keohane and Nye 
1977; Baldwin 1980), but they may be even more relevant in the context of ‘vertical’ 
intergovernmental relations because of the role that local authorities often play in policy 
implementation.  
 
‘Urban regime’ perspectives apply these principles of interdependence to ‘horizontal’ 
relationships within cities, highlighting how state and non-state actors mobilize and blend 
resources to achieve policy objectives within a locality (Davies and Trounstine 2012; Davies 
and Blanco 2017). Stone’s (1989) seminal study of Atlanta found that the city government 
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had to work extremely closely with private businesses in order to have the ‘power to’ address 
racial tensions effectively. Central to Stone’s conception of a regime was its relatively stable 
and institutionalised nature (which survives changes in party political control), its inclusion 
of powerful state and non-state actors, and its reliance on voluntary co-operation and informal 
rules. Others have drawn on these principles to characterise local climate governance 
arrangements in regime terms (Gibbs and Jonas 2000), highlighting that action to tackle 
environmental problems spans electoral cycles. They stress that key municipal officials often 
remain in place even when a ruling party or mayor is ousted (Pasquini and Shearing 2014), 
and that non-state actors seek to continue working with their successors afterwards. However, 
this literature tends to focus on the definition of a ‘regime’ and whether specific case study 
cities are ruled by them or not (Mossberger and Stoker 2001), the role of non-profit actors in 
this particular form of governance (Stokes et al. 2014) or the factors that may lead to its 
emergence (Thiers et al. 2017). Critics have argued that it fails to explain how policy might 
change and does not take full account of the vertical intergovernmental context (Rast 2015). 
Stone himself has acknowledged these weaknesses, partly attributing them to his initial 
thinking being shaped in the relatively stable context of Atlanta during the post-war 
‘redevelopment’ era (Stone 2015).  
 
Underlying this critique is the fact that most regime studies do not focus on the power 
relationships that operate within urban governance. Consequently, they do not help to identify 
which actors are influencing decision-making. Although Rhodes’ insight into power 
dependencies developed from his analysis of vertical governance relationships, it can also 
provide the theoretical support for a horizontal analysis within localities – whether they 
qualify as ‘regimes’ or not. Central to his understanding of power within these relationships 
was identifying which resources each tier of government is dependent upon and who can 
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provide those resources. These resources are not solely financial: they may also be 
constitutional or political, shaped by the hierarchical nature of intergovernmental relations, or 
associated with particular expertise or access to information.  
 
Since state actors need to adopt a more inclusive and holistic approach to address wicked 
issues, we might expect resource interdependence (along both the ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ 
dimensions) to be particularly relevant in sectors such as climate change (Torfing 2012). 
Assuming that decision-makers are rational actors, and therefore seek to adopt the most 
realistic and effective way of making and implementing policy, we can see how subnational 
governments will recognise the need to collaborate (and potentially compromise) with 
external actors in order to achieve their objectives in these circumstances (Sellers and 
Lidström 2007). With this in mind, we can view the resulting (local) governance 
arrangements as the consequence of state actors working with other stakeholders to increase 
their political power (Peters and Pierre 2001; Davies and Trounstine 2012). Furthermore, 
because state actors in some jurisdictions are likely to have more capacity than their 
counterparts elsewhere (Sellers 2002), we can apply these principles in comparative analysis.  
 
Rhodes developed his thinking in later publications (Rhodes 1986, 1997), and argued that the 
degree of interdependence between central and local government in Britain led to the 
development of cohesive networks. These networks were built on high levels of trust between 
governing actors, and they made and implemented policy. This led to others categorising 
networks by their degree of integration (see for example Atkinson and Coleman 1992; Jordan 
and Schubert 1992) in an attempt to describe the type of relationship between state and non-
state actors. Bevir and Rhodes (2010) characterised this debate around networks as the ‘first 
wave’ of governance thinking, and argued that a second wave, which focused on the notion 
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of ‘metagovernance’ (Jessop 2002), followed shortly afterwards. Metagovernance 
perspectives stressed that public officials could steer and direct non-state actors that operate 
in the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2011) in order to try and achieve policy 
goals (Whitehead 2003). However, Bevir and Rhodes pointed out the lack of theoretical 
underpinning in both network governance and metagovernance, and promoted a third wave of 
governance instead. This views ‘the state’ in terms of the patterns of rule that shape the 
behaviour of governing actors, and therefore emphasises the importance of analysing the 
beliefs, traditions and cultural practices that influence individuals responsible for 
policymaking (Bevir and Rhodes 2010). 
 
In addition to all of this, to explain policymaking processes we further need to understand the 
power relationships and structures that operate within governance arrangements – not (just) 
which organisations and individuals belong in them and how they operate (Kooiman 1993). 
In other words, we need a theory of power to identify which actors are influencing decision-
making and why policies might develop in a particular way (Marsh and Rhodes 1992). This 
returns us to Rhodes’ (1981) previous point about the importance of identifying how 
resources are distributed between governing actors and how this shapes interdependent power 
relationships.  
 
At the same time, resource interdependence does not necessarily lead to policy congruence or 
improved co-ordination across tiers of government. How organisations help each other to 
achieve their objectives characterises vertical and horizontal governance relationships. Yet, 
lower tiers of government are not always obliged to implement central policies in return for 
receiving resources (Capano 2011), particularly if they are in a strong negotiating position. In 
such situations, central and subnational governments might pursue conflicting agendas, as the 
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case of climate policy in the US and Australia during the early 2000s illustrated (Bulkeley 
2010, Bomberg 2017). Therefore, city and state authorities that have sufficient internal 
capacity can adopt much more progressive – or regressive – climate policies than their 
national governments or other horizontal actors may wish. Alternatively, organisations with 
very low levels of internal capacity might become particularly reliant on external resources 
and have less control over resultant policymaking.  By extension, shifts in the level of 
internal capacity would affect the nature of power relations within the area, and therefore its 
policymaking arrangements. In other words, this perspective can address the criticism that 
Stone’s regime approach does not explain change, because it follows that shifts in the 
distribution of resources between interdependent urban actors might result in different urban 
governance arrangements. 
 
Rhodes argued that different tiers of government are always interdependent, but suggested 
that one level may be more dependent on another if the resource exchange between them is 
asymmetrical. Additionally, however, if neither organisation provides the other with much 
support, they would actually both be operating relatively independently (see Eckersley 2017a, 
which provides the theoretical framework for this article). As a result, three types of power 
dependency relationship may develop – although we should not expect every example of 
policymaking to fit comfortably within each of these categories. 
 
Figure 1, which I adapt to illustrate the empirical findings, maps power relations in terms of 
all three potential scenarios (interdependence, dependence and independence) and along both 
the vertical and horizontal dimensions of governance. The diagrams take the municipality’s 
perspective; therefore, where an organisation is located near the dependence pole, this is 
because the local authority relies more heavily on other actors than they do on it. By the same 
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token, the closer a council lies to the independence end of an axis, the more autonomously it 
operates. If it sits in the middle, it is highly interdependent with other actors along that 
particular dimension.  
 
Figure 1: Power dependency relationships along vertical and horizontal dimensions (adapted 
from Eckersley 2017a) 
 
Furthermore, these relationships can also help explicate the policy approach that a 
subnational government might adopt. For example, where a municipality is highly 
interdependent with (or dependent on) other horizontal actors, it may need to adopt a strategy 
of engagement to persuade them to collaborate in governance arrangements – whereas greater 
independence might allow it to operate more hierarchically within the city. This may then 
influence policy outputs, because private actors might exert a level of influence over 
decision-making commensurate with the resources they provide. Put more simply, we could 
argue that greater horizontal independence for the municipality might result in more 
progressive climate policies.  
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Case selection and method 
 
There are significant differences between the subnational government systems of Germany 
and England (Norton 1994), and therefore it is particularly useful to compare how these 
structures influence local power relations and policy-making arrangements in the two 
countries. For example, until a ‘general power of competence’ came into force through the 
Localism Act 2011, English councils could only do what was expressly permitted in statute; 
otherwise they would be acting ultra vires (outside the law) and could be prosecuted. 
Furthermore, English councils have far less power to raise their own revenues: indeed they 
are much more reliant on central funding than in other large countries in western Europe 
(Ferry et al. 2015). This contrasts with a long-standing constitutional guarantee of lokale 
Selbstverwaltung (local self-administration) in Germany, which has since the early 1800s 
enabled municipalities to undertake any activity not prohibited by law and exercise much 
more control over revenue streams. Similarly, as a unitary state (notwithstanding devolution 
to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland at the end of the 1990s), England’s subnational 
system of government is substantially different from that of federal Germany. Such contrasts 
have led some academics to characterise Germany as a ‘Type I’ multi-level governance 
arrangement (Herrschel and Newman 2002), whereas England is much more akin to Type II 
(Miller et al. 2000).  
 
Despite these differences, however, the cities of Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle share many 
common features, facilitating a ‘most similar systems design’ (Przeworski and Teune 1970) 
and control for a large number of other variables. First, they are very similar in size: 
Newcastle has 270,000 and Gelsenkirchen 260,000 inhabitants, and both are situated within 
larger conurbations – the Tyne and Wear region and the Ruhrgebiet in North Rhine-
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Westphalia, respectively. Second, they were both strongly associated with heavy industry 
between the eighteenth and mid-twentieth centuries – coal mining was a major employer in 
both, Gelsenkirchen had a large steel sector and Newcastle was a big shipbuilding centre. 
Third, this shared history has left a common legacy of deindustrialisation and economic 
decline since the late 1960s, which both cities have sought to address by re-branding 
themselves as forward-looking, sustainable locations to attract investment from the low-
carbon sector (Jung et al. 2010; Bulkeley and Betsill 2003). For example, both municipalities 
set themselves explicit targets to reduce the level of carbon dioxide emissions by over 20% 
between 2005 and 2020 (Stadt Gelsenkirchen 2011; Newcastle City Council 2010). In 
summary, the cities have similar socioeconomic ‘starting points’ for their climate protection 
policies, and also have similar objectives. This study analysed the policy-making 
arrangements that each municipality adopted in order to achieve these goals. 
 
The research involved 35 semi-structured, anonymised interviews with a total of 38 people in 
the two cities. Fifteen of the discussions, which covered 19 individuals, were in 
Gelsenkirchen and the surrounding area, and the remaining 20 interviews involved 19 
individuals in Newcastle. I conducted the Newcastle fieldwork between January 2012 and 
March 2016, and the Gelsenkirchen interviews between June and September 2013. Thirty of 
the 34 conversations were face-to-face, two by telephone, and one in each case study city by 
email. The interviewees worked in a range of council departments, including environment, 
planning, economic development, corporate procurement and policy, and included some very 
senior managers in both municipalities. I also spoke to staff in a number of other public 
bodies, as well as representatives from the local voluntary sector in each city. In order to 
identify the nature of resource dependency relationships, I asked interviewees about the 
funding they received to support climate initiatives, staffing levels, sources of legal and 
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practical advice, the frequency, content and nature of meetings with other policy actors, any 
requirements for consulting on decisions, and their overall views on how policies evolved. I 
also triangulated the interview data with a range of other sources, including academic 
analyses, statistics on carbon emissions, media coverage, grey literature, minutes from 
meetings, policy documents and legislation. Significant contrasts in the nature of climate 
policy-making in Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle were revealed. 
 
Research findings 
 
Climate change policy-making in Gelsenkirchen 
 
Vertical governance structures 
 
Gelsenkirchen Council receives substantial support from higher tiers of government to help 
with climate policy, yet it also enjoys significant autonomy in decision-making. The 
municipality received federal government funding to cover 90% of the budget for 
implementing its climate protection strategy, the Klimaschutzkonzept (interview 21), but can 
determine the nature, timing and type of projects that it wishes to undertake (interview 14). 
Nevertheless, my fieldwork revealed that public bodies at all levels cooperated closely in 
order to achieve common policy goals, in line with the notion of Politikverflechtung (usually 
translated as ‘cooperative federalism’, Scharpf et al. 1976). Politikverflechtung in the climate 
and energy sectors has been further encouraged by the Energiewende narrative, which 
stresses how Germany needs to move away from its reliance on fossil fuels and nuclear 
power, and towards renewable sources.  
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Indeed, a number of interviewees in Gelsenkirchen cited both the Energiewende and 
Politikverflechtung as pervading influences over climate protection policy in the city 
(interviews 16, 19 and 21). In line with previous studies (Moss et al. 2015; Huß 2014), these 
individuals stressed how a culture of mutual support and collaboration (both within and 
between public bodies) made it easier to coordinate activities and implement policy. 
Similarly, interviewees in the regional Bezirk (an arm of the Land government) saw their role 
as being primarily to help municipalities to bid for funding and deliver local policy objectives 
– rather than stipulating what the money should be spent on, or auditing specific projects. As 
such, their relationship with local government is more akin to that of consultant-client than 
master-servant (interview 26). This trend towards even greater interdependence between tiers 
of government has provided Gelsenkirchen Council with more capacity and ‘power to’ 
achieve its policy objectives.  
 
Horizontal governance structures  
 
German municipalities have retained a greater degree of control over local utilities and other 
public services than their English counterparts (Bulkeley and Kern 2006; Becker et al. 2015). 
This suggests that Gelsenkirchen Council would have a stronger position in local governance 
arrangements than its counterpart in Newcastle, because it has direct influence over a broader 
range of public services and horizontal actors. Indeed, its strategy of reimagining the city as a 
centre for solar energy during the 1990s and 2000s, together with the ambitious initiatives 
that flowed from this vision, highlights how the council sought to act largely independently 
of other horizontal actors in in trying to re-orient the city’s economic and political outlook 
around environmental protection (Jung et al. 2010).  
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Similarly, the municipality took a very strong leadership role in developing the city’s climate 
protection strategy (the Klimaschutzkonzept). An advisory body of municipal officers and 
politicians, together with some managers from the local energy supplier ELE (in which the 
council also holds a 16% stake), drafted this document: other businesses and voluntary 
groups in the city were not involved in its preparation (interviews 14 and 21). Some council 
staff have since engaged with other local stakeholders to try and persuade them to play their 
part in achieving the planned carbon emissions reductions, for example by encouraging firms 
to reduce their reliance on road transport. However, it is notable that this only happened after 
the council formally adopted the strategy, thereby highlighting the extent to which it operated 
largely independently of other local actors in policy formulation.  
 
Interestingly, neither public officials nor other stakeholders in Gelsenkirchen questioned the 
municipality’s leadership role and authority within the city. This highlights the fact that the 
authority had the capacity to exert very strong influence over other local actors, and could 
employ more traditional hierarchical approaches to policy-making – something that one 
interviewee argued also applied to other German councils: 
 
‘Municipalities in Germany… do not have to do much with civil society. They don’t 
have to work with other actors – at least at the moment’ (interview 27). 
 
Even in areas where the council has asked non-state actors in the city to contribute towards 
Gelsenkirchen’s climate objectives (such as retrofitting private buildings and encouraging 
more sustainable commuting), these organisations have largely been happy to do the 
municipality’s bidding (Eckersley 2017b). Interviewees attributed this willingness to the 
authority’s dominant position as the city’s democratically elected body, which meant that 
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other actors felt compelled to respect its policies (interviews 14 and 21). Furthermore, 
because German councils are embedded into the constitutional framework and receive 
support from other tiers of government, these legal and political resources enhance the 
position of municipalities within their localities. Indeed, the overall impression from 
conducting fieldwork in both countries was that German councils are held in higher esteem 
than their English counterparts.  
 
However, Gelsenkirchen Council no longer has complete control over all local public 
services and utilities through the city’s Stadtwerke, after it sold off or outsourced various 
functions in the 1990s (interview 24). Consequently, it operates within a more fragmented 
institutional arrangement than was previously the case, which means that it needs to liaise 
with external organisations on issues related to climate protection. Moreover, the ‘wicked’ 
nature of climate change has meant that the council cannot rely solely on public bodies to 
make and implement policy. Slowly, but surely, Gelsenkirchen Council has sought to involve 
other local actors in climate protection, largely because decision-makers have acknowledged 
the necessity of persuading residents and businesses to change their behaviour in order to 
reduce carbon emissions (interviews 14 and 15). Indeed, the authority’s Klimaschutzkonzept 
notes how the municipality is only responsible for 2% of the city’s CO2 emissions, and 
therefore private households and businesses need to make a significant contribution towards 
achieving the city’s climate policy objectives. Officers in the municipality recognise that they 
have to adopt an ‘enabling’ mode of governance (Bulkeley and Kern 2006) to achieve this, 
and have sought to operate more interdependently by persuading local actors to engage with 
climate protection initiatives, rather than introducing binding regulations.  
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For example, the council has launched marketing campaigns to inform households and 
businesses of the potential benefits from feed-in tariffs if they install PV panels (interviews 
19 and 24). In 2012 and 2014 it organised climate conferences and invited key actors from 
across the city to share ideas on carbon reduction (interview 20). It has also introduced other 
initiatives to persuade stakeholders within Gelsenkirchen to change their behaviour, 
including: encouraging cycling through a rent-a-bike initiative; a more coordinated campaign 
to encourage people to use public transport and car-sharing schemes; real-time updates to 
bus, train and tram timetables; and engagement with private sector landlords to improve the 
energy efficiency of their properties (Stadt Gelsenkirchen 2011).  
 
This greater reliance on ‘new’ environmental policy instruments (Jordan et al. 2005) and 
horizontal governance tools shows how the municipality recognises that it needs to work with 
other societal actors in order to have the capacity to achieve its climate objectives (interview 
20). These capacity constraints are partly financial (for example, this was certainly the key 
driver behind privatising the Stadtwerke), partly due to the fact that pre-existing state 
institutions were unable to respond effectively to industrial decline, and partly a function of 
the fact that ‘wicked’ issues need responses from both state and societal actors. Nonetheless, 
despite the trend towards more horizontal interdependence in Gelsenkirchen, the council is 
still in a stronger and more independent position than its English counterpart vis à vis other 
local actors (see Figure 2). 
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Climate change policy-making in Newcastle 
 
Vertical governance structures 
 
Recent changes in central-local relations in England have meant that local authorities are 
operating increasingly independently of other vertical actors (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012; 
Lowndes and Gardner 2016). These changes include the Localism Act 2011, which heralded 
the abolition of centralised performance management frameworks and the introduction of a 
‘general power of competence’, as well as significant reductions in grant funding. The 
developments have had significant implications for local governance and climate protection, 
particularly in Newcastle. For example, the level of central grants to Newcastle Council fell 
by £289 per head between 2010 and 2015 – more than double the English average – at a time 
when demographic changes were increasing the demands on local public services (Kelly 
2015). Although some ministerial funding streams for local climate mitigation did survive 
initially (such as money to finance the installation of charging points for electric vehicles), 
there are very few other central government revenue sources available (interviews 8 and 12). 
Furthermore, central government no longer provides much advice to councils on 
environmental priorities (interview 36), and has significantly reduced the number of 
sustainability indicators and targets against which municipalities must monitor their 
performance. This has resulted in less interaction between tiers, with fewer opportunities to 
share information and provide reciprocal support for policy-making and implementation: in 
short, Newcastle now operates even more independently of central resources than was 
previously the case. In addition, unlike the Energiewende in Germany, there is no clear 
narrative around which governance actors can coalesce that also relates to those based outside 
the environmental policy sector. Therefore, even though different tiers of government agree 
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about the need to combat climate change and reduce carbon emissions, there is a lack of 
leadership, coordination and direction. As we shall see, the changing nature of this central-
local relationship played a key role in shaping the city’s horizontal governance arrangements, 
due to its impact on municipal capacity.  
 
Horizontal governance structures  
 
Newcastle has sought to work much more interdependently with other horizontal actors than 
has Gelsenkirchen. For example, although council officers drafted the city’s original climate 
change strategy document, they incorporated ideas and input from other organisations in the 
city, including universities, hospitals, the police, the transport authority and some community 
groups. The drafting process also included formal consultations, through which senior 
officers considered whether ideas from the public could be included in the final document 
(interview 31). This approach contrasts sharply with that of Gelsenkirchen, where the only 
contributors to its Klimaschutzkonzept were either employees of the municipality or the 
energy supplier ELE – other actors did not even get to see the plan until after its publication. 
Additionally, as part of Newcastle’s overall strategy of involving societal groups in 
policymaking, the council organised open ‘Green Cabinet’ meetings, involving businesses, 
voluntary groups, academics and citizens, who debate and contribute towards the city’s 
environmental strategy. It has also provided strong support to grassroots projects such as 
‘Greening Wingrove’, a community co-operative aimed at encouraging residents to live more 
sustainably and improve their local environment (interview 31; Davoudi and Brooks 2016).  
 
Leading politicians in the city’s Labour group were keen to develop a broad societal coalition 
for policymaking and implementation before taking office in 2011. Nonetheless, the financial 
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austerity that has affected all English councils (but particularly northern urban municipalities 
such as Newcastle) accelerated this process: 
 
‘This would have been core Council policy, whatever the financial challenges. It’s 
something that the Leader and the Cabinet believe in very much… And the budget 
challenges mean that we simply don’t have a choice – this isn’t something that we’d 
like to do, this is something that we must do if we’re going to preserve public 
services, because the Council simply won’t have the money to do all of those things’ 
(interview 30). 
 
These political preferences reflected a belief that greater horizontal interdependence would 
make it easier for the municipality to achieve its objectives, because pooling resources with 
other organisations would increase the city’s capacity to implement policy. Crucially, 
however, the increasing level of resource independence along the vertical dimension played a 
key role in accelerating this strategy. For example, central government funding cuts have led 
to the municipality reducing its spending on public parks by 90% between 2010 and 2017, 
and the authority has responded by seeking to transfer responsibilities for their operation and 
maintenance to a charitable trust (Newcastle City Council 2017).  
 
In particular, the council’s relationship with Newcastle University has proved crucial in 
developing and implementing the city’s sustainable development strategy. The two 
organisations collaborated closely together in the redevelopment of a large brownfield site in 
the city centre (Science Central), which will feature a number of state of the art 
environmental features (interview 11 and 31) and forms a core part of this strategy. Notably, 
the university – not the council – has  taken the lead in ensuring that Science Central acts a 
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beacon of sustainability. Staff within the municipality are comfortable with this arrangement, 
given that the academic institution has significantly more resources and capacity to integrate 
climate change considerations into the overall design of the development (interview 6). More 
pertinently, the authority recognised that it would be unable to manage the project without the 
heavy involvement of other local actors. This was particularly the case from 2010 onwards, 
when the UK Government abolished the network of regional development agencies that 
provided councils with funding and advice on regeneration projects and began to reduce the 
level of central grants to municipalities (interviews 6 and 11). As this suggests, Newcastle’s 
increasing degree of vertical independence from central government led to it becoming more 
dependent on other local actors to achieve these policy objectives.  
 
Crucially, however, it means that the university (rather than the council) shapes how 
sustainability priorities are operationalised on the Science Central site, with the result that it 
has been designed primarily as a ‘living laboratory’ that produces data for scientific research, 
rather than a democratically-led project to support policy goals on low-carbon lifestyles and 
social inclusion (interview 13). Horizontal power relationships within Newcastle mean that 
such initiatives are more closely aligned with the university’s interests, rather than those of 
the wider local community. By becoming increasingly dependent on the university to develop 
and implement the city’s sustainability and climate change strategy, the council has ceded 
some control over determining and implementing policy. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Overall, therefore, Newcastle Council works far more interdependently (and increasingly 
dependently) with other local actors when compared to Gelsenkirchen. This is primarily due 
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to the fact that it receives fewer resources from the UK government and therefore has less 
capacity to act independently and exert hierarchical authority over other societal actors. In 
contrast, the Energiewende narrative and the tradition of Politikverflechtung ensure that 
different vertical actors provide mutual support and coordinate on policymaking and 
implementation in Gelsenkirchen, resulting in a municipality that has more capacity to act 
independently of other organisations in the locality. Figure 2 illustrates these vertical and 
horizontal relationships in both cities, and also highlights the fact that they are changing. 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in vertical and horizontal power dependencies for climate policymaking in 
Gelsenkirchen and Newcastle 
 
Along the horizontal dimension, Newcastle Council’s recent decisions to allocate an 
increasing number of public functions to external organisations (such as the university and 
Greening Wingrove) mean that its climate change strategy is increasingly dependent on other 
actors within the city. Gelsenkirchen Council operates more independently along the 
horizontal dimension than its English counterpart. This is because it can exercise more 
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control over local public services, and – crucially – because of the support it receives from 
higher tiers of government. Nonetheless, the German municipality has begun to realise that 
the actions of organisations outside the local authority will play a key role in the success of 
its climate protection initiatives, and this has led to it working slightly more interdependently 
with other actors in the city than previously. Both cities are shifting away from horizontal 
independence (albeit from different starting points), as they try to persuade societal actors to 
support council objectives, seek out additional resources, and facilitate behavioural change 
amongst local businesses and citizens. These changes were necessary to address the complex 
and unprecedented challenge of climate change, which means that the state has to collaborate 
much more with other societal actors.  
 
Nevertheless, robust interdependent relationships with higher tiers of government allow 
Gelsenkirchen Council to continue enjoying a stronger position within the city than 
Newcastle. This provides it with additional capacity, which enables it to operate more 
independently of other local actors and pursue ambitious climate policies. For its part, 
government policies have since 2010 made Newcastle Council increasingly independent of 
the centre and weakened municipal capacity to achieve policy objectives. Alongside a more 
fragmented local state, this has led municipal decision-makers to try to mobilise a broad 
coalition of local stakeholders on the issue of climate change in order to address it more 
effectively. This shows how greater vertical independence has resulted in more horizontal 
dependence, because the council does not have the capacity to act alone. Critically, since this 
means that Newcastle Council has less control over decision-making than its German 
counterpart, its policies may be less congruent with the municipality’s core objectives. As the 
Science Central development illustrated, higher levels of horizontal dependency can still lead 
to ambitious sustainability initiatives, but they are more likely to serve the interests of those 
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local actors who play an instrumental role in their conception and delivery, rather than those 
of the wider city. This shows how the resources, capacity and institutional contexts within 
which these municipalities operate can shape the nature of local governance arrangements 
and – ultimately – policy outputs.   
 
These findings have significant implications for proponents of ‘localism’, since they suggest 
that greater vertical independence for municipal governments might strengthen societal actors 
at the expense of the local state. Such an eventuality could mean that policies reflect the 
private interests of powerful non-state actors, rather than the priorities of democratically-
elected councillors and mayors. By weakening the capacity of municipalities, they might also 
preclude councils from adopting the kind of ambitious policy instruments that may be 
necessary to address climate change effectively, because officials could take the view that 
they might not be deliverable in the face of strong opposition from non-state actors 
(Meadowcroft 2009). In contrast, ‘joint-decision’ systems are more likely to strengthen the 
hand of the state in governance arrangements, despite some critics arguing that they result in 
bureaucratic and sub-optimal decision-making (Scharpf 1988). 
 
Although previous studies have recognised that governance ‘happens’ along both vertical and 
horizontal dimensions and involves a range of different actors, they have not necessarily 
helped us to identify the extent to which individual actors influence decisions. Similarly, 
critics of the regime perspective have argued that it does not help to explain policy change or 
take sufficient account of the importance of vertical intergovernmental relations. I have 
addressed both of these issues, by stressing that examining resource (inter)dependencies 
across both vertical and horizontal dimensions can unpick power relationships within 
governance arrangements, and thereby arrive at a better understanding of policymaking 
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processes. Furthermore, I have highlighted how the level and nature of central government 
support for subnational bodies play a key role in shaping how municipalities work with other 
local actors, and how these interactions can ultimately influence policy outputs. 
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Appendix: Details of fieldwork interviews 
 
 
Date Reference 
number 
Method  Number of 
interviewee(s) 
Organisation 
06/01/2012 1 Face-to-face 2 Newcastle City Council 
16/02/2012 2 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
05/03/2012 3 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
11/06/2012 4 Face-to-face 1 Your Homes Newcastle 
23/07/2012 5 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
15/10/2012 6 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
09/11/2012 7 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
09/11/2012 8 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
16/11/2012 9 Face-to-face 2 Newcastle City Council 
27/02/2013 10 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
28/02/2013 11 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle Science Central 
08/04/2013 12 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
19/06/2013 13 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle University 
27/06/2013 14 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
27/06/2013 15 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
27/06/2013 16 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
09/07/2013 17 Face-to-face 2 Gelsenkirchen Council 
15/07/2013 18 Face-to-face 2 Gelsenkirchen Council 
16/07/2013 19 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
16/07/2013 20 Face-to-face 2 
Gelsenkirchen Council and 
Solarstadt Gelsenkirchen 
18/07/2013 21 Face-to-face 3 Gelsenkirchen Council 
18/07/2013 22 Face-to-face 2 Gelsenkirchen Council 
19/07/2013 23 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
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19/07/2013 24 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
22/07/2013 25 Face-to-face 1 Gelsenkirchen Council 
25/07/2013 26 Telephone 1 GMP Architects 
25/07/2013 27 Face-to-face 2 Münster Bezirksregierung 
22/09/2013 28 Telephone 1 
North Rhine-Westphalian 
Audit Commission 
28/09/2013 
29 
Email 
1 
SOL Community 
Association 
09/12/2013 30 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
08/05/2014 31 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle Science City 
10/06/2014 32 Face-to-face 1 Climate North East 
29/08/2014 33 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle Science City 
13/05/2015 34 Email 1 Newcastle City Council 
24/03/2016 35 Face-to-face 1 Newcastle City Council 
 
